ABSTRACT
The salient feature of the BTA is that the United States agrees to accord normal trade relations status (formerly known as most favored nation, or MFN, status) to Vietnam, albeit subject to annual renewal. Thus Vietnam will move from column 2 to column 1 tariff rates, allowing Vietnamese goods to enter the U.S. at the same low tariff rates that apply to almost every other country. In practice this is expected to reduce the tariff on Vietnamese goods entering the U.S. from around 40% to 3% (EIU 2001) . Over a period of three years Vietnam will cut the tariffs it charges on imports from the U.S., typically by about a third 1 , and will eliminate its quantitative restrictions on many agricultural and industrial products over three to seven years.
The real significance of the BTA is, however, that it goes well beyond tariff reductions, and in effect maps out a strategy for Vietnam's economic development. It introduces more competition into the economy, and pushes reform and growth overall, especially in the state sector. Among the other provisions of the agreement are the following:
• Vietnam will adopt World Trade Organization standards for intellectual property protection within 18 months, a move that will require significant legal changes within the country.
• U.S. companies are to be allowed to enter the services sector, including insurance and banking, accounting and legal services, engineering, computer and related services, market research, construction, education, health and related services, and tourism as well as (after 3-9 years) telecommunications. However foreign investors will not be allowed more than a 50% stake in telecommunications ventures, and will not have independent access to international gateways, effectively preserving Vietnam Telecom's profitable monopoly.
• Vietnam is to eliminate trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), such as requirements that firms in Vietnam purchase some proportion of their inputs locally. The dual pricing structure, which charges foreign-owned firms more than local businesses for such things as phone calls and domestic flights, is to be replaced by unitary prices. The rule that allows minority owners to veto some decisions in a joint venture enterprise is to be removed eventually. For most sectors, the investment-licensing regime is to be replaced by one of investment registration, which will remove an important layer of bureaucratic discretion. However this will not apply to the important areas of television broadcasting, publication and distribution of cultural products, insurance, banking, and brokerage.
• Transparency. Investment rules are to be published in a clear and timely manner, with advance public notice and time for comment. There is provision for arbitration to settle disputes.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Pete Peterson, has argued, "the Agreement will yield significant economic benefits to both nations" (http://usembassy.state.gov/vietnam/). The agreement is widely viewed as setting Vietnam on a path to joining the World Trade Organization within two to three years.
The most immediate effect of the BTA is expected to be a rapid increase in Vietnam's exports to the United States, especially of garments and footwear. Vietnam's exports to the U.S. are already growing fast, jumping from $319 million in 1996 to $822 million by 2000 (Table 1 ), although they are low when compared to those of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand (Table 2 ).
Vietnam's leading export item to the U.S. is seafood, followed by footwear, coffee, and crude oil.
The U.S. imported over $50 million worth of garments in 2001, representing just 0.1% of its total garment imports; this figure is expected to rise rapidly, and quickly to exceed $1 billion (a level achieved in 1997 by 16 countries, including Thailand, the Philippines and Sri Lanka).
In an important study of the economic effects of the agreement, Fukase and Martin (1999) adapted the now-standard GTAP (global trade analysis project) computable general equilibrium model to Vietnam, and used it to trace the effect on Vietnam of lower United States tariffs. Based on trade and tariff data for 1997, they find that Vietnam's exports to the United States "would more than double after a change to MFN status" (p. i) , and that at a minimum Vietnam's real income would rise by 0.9%. Given that Vietnam's exports to the U.S. in 2001 were twice as high as in 1997, it is reasonable to infer that the real income gain to Vietnam is likely to be substantially larger than the amount projected by Fukase and Martin. 
Foreign Direct Investment
Since Vietnam first allowed foreign investment into the country in 1988, there has been a substantial, if variable, inflow. There are a number of ways to measure the extent of FDI.
Investment commitments show the amount of investment pledged by foreign investors and their domestic partners (Table 3 , column A). Until the late 1990s, most of the foreign investment went into joint ventures, where the local partner typically provided 30% of the total value of the investment, usually in the form of land use rights; more recently, most foreign investment has flowed into 100% foreign-owned projects (see Table 4 ), especially those located in export processing and industrial zones.
Actual disbursements run well below commitments, and include the amounts financed by local partners and by local loans as well as through inflows from abroad ( Although the FDI series in Table 3 differ substantially from one another, they all show a clear pattern, which is evident from Figure 1 . Whether measured by commitments or disbursements, FDI rose rapidly in the early 1990s, peaking in about 1996 (commitments) or 1997
(disbursements), when it accounted for about a fifth of gross domestic fixed investment in
Vietnam and exceeded the levels of per capita FDI flowing into countries such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia and Pakistan (Haughton 1999, p.264 ). The peak was followed by a sharp decline in new commitments, although the level of FDI disbursements remained relatively steady.
Since 1999-2000 both commitments and disbursements have risen modestly. States ranks twelfth, in part because flows only began after the embargo was lifted in 1994. The sources of FDI vary substantially from year to year; for instance, the largest single source of FDI commitments in 1995 was Japan, after which the leader's baton was passed to Singapore (1996) , France (1997 ), Russia (1999 , the United Kingdom (2000) and the Netherlands (2001).
When Vietnam first opened up to foreign investment in 1998, FDI mainly flowed into the oil and gas industry. This was followed by substantial investments in hotels and tourism, as well as industrial parks. Recent flows have mainly gone into industry, often geared towards exporting (e.g. footwear, seafood processing, garments, electronics), as Table 5 shows. However, most of the investment in the early post-reform years flowed into protected sectors; between 1998 and 1996, 72% of FDI commitments were for projects in industries where the tariff rate was at least 10%, and 65% of commitments went to sectors where the effective rate of protection was at least 6,000 7,000 8,000
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60% (CIE 1998) . This has left a legacy of large investments in less competitive parts of the economy, helping to create a constituency that resists thoroughgoing trade liberalization.
The bulk of the FDI in 2001 went to Ho Chi Minh City and contiguous provinces, a pattern that has persisted for over a decade (Haughton 1999, 259-261) . Smaller, but still important, amounts flow to the northern provinces on the Hanoi-Haiphong axis (Table 5) . The BTA is expected to affect the flow of FDI in four main ways. First, it makes foreign investment easier, and hence potentially more attractive, by committing Vietnam to change from its current licensing regime to a registration system. Registration is automatic, whereas licensing requires permission, and hence is subject to delays and manipulation. Second, by opening up access to the US market -an economy that accounts for almost a quarter of world GDPVietnam becomes a more attractive export platform. For instance, Korean footwear firms are likely to expand their existing factories in Vietnam in order better to serve the US market. Third, the BTA has a psychological effect on United States (and perhaps other) investors, who are now likely to be less reluctant to invest in Vietnam. Fourth, the BTA forces Vietnam to open up more of the economy and dismantle or reduce a number of barriers to foreign direct investment, particularly in areas such as telecommunications and power generation.
The more difficult issue is to quantify the size of the BTA effect on FDI into Vietnam. The evidence from elsewhere suggests that it could be large. For instance, after Spain joined the European Union, total investment rose by 74% over the ensuing five years, compared with a drop totaling 7% over the previous five years. Likewise, foreign investment in Mexico rose sharply in the two years prior to Mexico's accession to the North American Free Trade Area in 1994.
Methodology
We approach the problem of quantifying the effect of the BTA on FDI flows by first specifying and estimating a model of the determinants of FDI flows per capita, using data from the countries of Asia for 1990 Asia for -1999 . In specifying the model we pay particular attention to the role played by WTO membership, and MFN status (for trade with the United States). We then use the estimates to simulate the effect, on Vietnam, of the BTA.
In order to isolate the effects of the BTA, and possible WTO membership, on foreign direct At first sight it is odd that foreign direct investment occurs at all. The multinational corporations that undertake FDI face higher costs operating in another country than do local firms -expensive expatriate labor, language barriers, limited local knowledge -and it might seem more sensible to use licensing agreements instead. The answer is that for companies to undertake FDI, they must have firm-specific advantages that exceed the disadvantages of operating abroad. These might include unlicensed secret technology (e.g. the formula for making Coca Cola), managerial knowhow (for instance in running luxury hotels), access to markets abroad, knowledge that is vested in individuals and that is not quickly or easily transferable (e.g. bankers), an ability to tap cheap capital (e.g. for oil exploration), design skills (e.g. architects, or shoe designers such as Nike), or a diversification of the location of production in order to spread risk (e.g. Honda setting up factories in the United States).
Given that a firm has such advantages, why might it choose to operate in one country -such as Vietnam -rather than another?
Clear influences: Openness and size
In a wide-ranging literature review, Chakrabarti (2001) finds that only two variables are consistently related to the size of FDI inflows, and they are openness, and market size.
Economies that are open to trade are attractive to foreign investors for two main reasons: the openness signals that the government has policies in place that welcome both trade and (by implication) competition, and it helps reassure investors that they can repatriate their profits.
Openness is typically measured as the ratio of exports (or exports plus imports) to GDP, although this is an imperfect measure because by this measure large economies typically appear to be less open. One could also measure openness by asking whether the country is a member of the World Trade Organization, which requires its members to reduce import barriers over time and to live by a well-established set of rules.
Some researchers use a measure of tariff barriers as a measure of openness. Curiously, this measure is not clearly related to FDI (Chakrabarti 2001, p.92) . Where some foreign investors are attracted to economies with low tariff barriers, others may be encouraged to jump the tariff barriers by setting up in a protected economy. Foreign investment in Vietnam takes both forms.
About 400,000 people now work in export-oriented mainly foreign-invested footwear factories, where trade barriers are low; on the other hand, 11 foreign-invested auto companies operate assembly plants in the country, producing entirely for a domestic market that purchased only
19,000 locally assembled vehicles in 2001 (EIU 2002).
Foreign investors also appear to prefer to set up in larger markets (Chakrabarti 2001, p.91) . If the firms are oriented towards the domestic market, this is in order to achieve economies of scale.
Even for export-oriented firms, a larger domestic economy typically provides a deeper pool of labor and more potential suppliers.
In our model of the determinants of foreign direct investment we include variables to control for openness (exports/GDP) and for market size (GDP/capita), as well as binary variables that indicate whether a country is a member of the World Trade Organization, and whether it has normal trade relations status with the United States.
Probable influences: Exchange rate, savings and macroeconomic stability
There is also solid, although not overwhelming, evidence that the amount of foreign investment that flows into a country depends on the country's exchange rate, savings rate, and macroeconomic stability.
It is widely believed that an overvalued exchange rate discourages foreign investors. Under such circumstances it would be difficult to use the country as a platform for exports, there would be strong competition from keenly priced imports, and the initial investment will be expensive.
Some researchers focus instead on the trade deficit, which will tend to widen when the currency is overvalued. The main problem in using these variables in empirical work arises in determining when an exchange rate is in fact overvalued, or when a trade deficit is too large.
McMillan (1998) examines the question of whether FDI substitutes for, or complements, domestically financed investment. A large FDI inflow could displace local investment; on the other hand it could increase the demand for associated investments in such activities as the provision of inputs and infrastructure. Based on a review of the literature, and her own work using data from Africa, she finds that higher levels of domestic investment and savings are associated with more, rather than less, FDI.
It is plausible that investors appreciate macroeconomic stability, including low inflation, a disciplined budget, and a sensible and reasonably stable exchange rate.
In our model of the determinants of FDI we include a measure of exchange rate undervaluation (but only beyond a threshold, on the grounds that a minor undervaluation is unlikely to have much effect), a variable that measures domestic savings as a proportion of GDP, and a measure of the budget deficit as a proportion of GDP (to serve as a proxy for macroeconomic stability).
Possible influences: growth, taxes, geography, wages, policies
In attempting to model the determinants of FDI, researchers have tried a long list of possible variables, including the following:
• The growth rate of GDP. There is fairly strong (although not ironclad) evidence of a strong association between FDI and economic growth (Chakrabarti 2001, p.92) . What is not clear is where the causality lies: fast-growing countries may attract investors, but the investment itself may boost growth.
• Tax incentives. These include such things as corporate income tax holidays, lower tax rates for foreign investment, and generous loss carry forward provisions. It is widely held that such incentives are of limited (albeit not negligible) value; what is more important is the overall investment climate, including the structure of taxes.
• Geography. Some researchers argue that FDI flows to countries that are well located because they are near markets (e.g. Ireland and the European Union), or are culturally accessible (e.g. Malaysia is English-speaking). There are, however, plenty of counterexamples, with substantial investment flowing to such out of the way places as Mauritius, and such culturally distinct countries as Thailand.
• Natural resources. Some FDI flows to countries that have natural resources, especially oil and minerals. On the other hand the presence of natural resources is no guarantee that foreign investors with be either interested (e.g. the Democratic Republic of Congo) or welcome. The bulk of FDI flows to sectors other than natural resources; countries with large resource endowments may actually be at a disadvantage in attracting this type of FDI.
• Low wages. It is sometimes argued that foreign investors are looking for low-wage locations. This is only partly true. Most FDI is still undertaken by developed-country firms in other developed countries. Even the FDI that flows to less-developed countries does not necessarily go to the lowest-wage countries (e.g. more goes to moderate-wage China than to low-wage India or Africa). Investors are interested in "good value labor" rather than cheap labor per se; the lure of Bangalore is not that computer programmers are paid wages that are low in absolute terms, but rather than they are very productive relative to what they need to be paid.
• Good infrastructure. A good infrastructure of roads, ports and telecommunications makes life easier for investors, but needs to be keenly priced if it is to be a selling point.
• Policy reforms. Claessens et al. argue that in the case of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, those countries that were early and committed reformers have had more success in attracting investment.
• Institutions. Societies that have greater freedoms, operate under the rule of law, and have low levels of corruption, are likely to prove attractive to investors.
We have not included any of these variables in our model of the determinants of FDI, for three reasons. First, in almost every case there is little evidence, from other studies, of a clear link.
Second, some of the measures are hard to measure or are unavailable; for instance, the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom is only available for 1995 (O'Driscoll et al. 2002 ), but we could not use it because we required data beginning in 1990. Third, we have a limited number of data points, and so need to be economical with the number of variables used in order to preserve enough degrees of freedom. Deichmann et al. (2001) deal with this problem by first creating factors that group variables together. Our preference is to restrict the number of variables a priori, to a few that have strong support from theory and previous studies; the results are then easier to interpret than the more amorphous groupings created by factor analysis.
Model
In seeking to explain the determinants of foreign direct investment flows, our model estimates an equation where the dependent variable is the log of real FDI/capita. More specifically, we have A complete list of the variables, along with sources, is given in the appendix. As indicated by our discussion both of the theoretical literature and past studies, the equation has measures of openness (exports/GDP; WTO membership; normal trade relations ("MFN") status with the United States)) and of market size (GDP/capita), as well as variables that pick up the effects of the exchange rate, domestic savings, and macroeconomic discipline.
Estimation Results
The results of estimating the model, which has the log of real FDI per capita as the dependent variable, are shown in Table 6 . The data come from 16 Asian countries for the period 1991-1999; since data are missing for some of the years, the total number of observations is only 114. In determining what countries and years to use we started with all Asian countries in the 1990s, but had to reduce the sample to just 16 of the original 34 countries because data on a number of the series were missing for some of the countries.
The model is somewhat non-linear. Although most empirical models of the determinants of FDI estimate a linear relationship (see e.g. Chakrabarti) , theory gives little guidance as to the appropriate functional form. Deichmann et al. (2001) undertake a factor analysis, and then apply a multiple adaptive regressive spline (MARS) model to explore for the most appropriate functional form for the factors. We too experimented somewhat before arriving at the results shown here, choosing one functional form over another if doing so raised the adjusted R 2 . With an adjusted R 2 of 0.93, the model fits well, is highly statistically significant (F=154), and the coefficients are plausible in sign and magnitude.
Openness matters, as one might expect (see e.g. Chakrabarti 2001) . Economies where exports represent a higher share of GDP are significantly more likely to attract foreign direct investment; perhaps these economies are more welcoming to foreign investors and traders in general, or perhaps foreign investors are more convinced that they will be able to repatriate profits in a more open economy.
The real effective exchange rate also influences FDI, in that a relatively undervalued exchange rate (REER above 130, given an initial level of 100 in 1991) is associated with more inflows.
This is in line with our expectations: an undervalued exchange rate is only likely to have a discernible effect on investment if it is substantially undervalued.
The government budget deficit only deters investors if it is at least 2% of GDP. This suggests that investors are tolerant of deficits within a normal or sustainable range, but become wary of countries where the budget deficits are large enough to raise doubts about a country's fiscal and macroeconomic discipline.
Does FDI flow to countries that are low savers (and so need foreign savings) or high savers (for whom the foreign investment complements the substantial level of domestic investment)? Our results show that FDI flows somewhat to low savers, less so to moderately good savers, and more so to high savers. The turning point -i.e. the point of minimum FDI inflows, other things being equal -is when the savings rate is 26% of GDP. This result hints at different motives for FDIfinancing resource-intensive activities in low-saving societies, and providing a package of managerial and firm-specific skills in high-saving economies.
The results in Table 6 also show that the effects of changes in the independent variables are felt not only in the year in which they occur, but also in future years. The Coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 0.717, which means that the long-run effects are 3.5 times larger than the short-run effects.
Our principal interest is in the effects on FDI inflows of a) whether a country has normal trade relations status with the United States and b) whether a country is a member of the World Trade
Organization. The estimates in Table 6 show that for a very poor country normal trade relations status in the absence of WTO membership contributes substantially to the inflow of direct investment. As a country becomes better off the effect of normal trade relations status becomes weaker, and by the time per capita income rises to about $700 (in 1991 prices) FDI flows will actually decline unless the country is a member of the WTO. Since MFN is a prerequisite to WTO membership, the implication is that a country that has MFN, but does not move on the evidence that the government has not maintained the momentum for reform.
To estimate the effects of the BTA (and later, WTO membership) on FDI into Vietnam, we first created a baseline simulation, which estimates FDI inflows through to 2010 on the assumption of no BTA and no WTO membership, given plausible projections for economic growth. Then we use the estimated model to construct a new projection of FDI, given the BTA (which we take as becoming effective in 2002) and WTO membership (which we assume starts in 2005).
The results are shown graphically in Figure 2 , and incorporate the lagged effects of any changes.
The immediate effect of the BTA should be a 30% jump in FDI; eventually FDI will essentially double, and settle into that new path. By any standards this is a large effect. These results are of course subject to uncertainty, and especially so the further one projects into the future. However they are strongly indicative of a major effect. An additional $800 million of additional realized FDI annually would raise investment by 9%; assuming an unchanged incremental capital output ratio, the growth rate (6.75% in 2000, 6.8% in 2001) would also rise by 9%, or by about 0.6 percentage points annually. The three main benefits conveyed by WTO membership are that it forces countries to introduce and maintain a relatively liberal economic structure, gives them permanent and unconditional MFN status with all other members, and provides access to a dispute settlement mechanism (Michalopoulos) .
In order to join the WTO, Vietnam will probably have to make similar changes to those undertaken by China in its successful quest for membership. Apart from introducing substantial legal and institutional changes, China has committed itself to lowering its import tariffs from 21%
(on a trade-weighted basis) to 8%. Vietnam's trade-weighted average tariff rate in the mid 1990s was quite similar, at 19% (Martin 2000) , although this does not take the substantial degree of smuggling into account. Ianchovichina and Martin (2001) , using a computable general equilibrium model, find that as a result of WTO membership, China's share of world trade is likely to rise from 3.7% (in 1995) to 6.8%, and the wages of unskilled workers will rise sharply.
Vietnam is likely to see comparable changes if and when it becomes a member of the WTO.
Conclusions
The BTA will boost FDI into Vietnam, by as much as 30% initially. This is in line with the experience of Spain in the first years of EU membership, and Mexico prior to NAFTA entry.
Eventually, annual GDP growth is likely to be about 0.6 percentage points higher than without the BTA.
However the effects of the BTA will not be enough to maintain the FDI inflow over the long run.
For that, Vietnam will need to join WTO, and hence to undertake the reforms that are required as a pre-requisite for membership.
Our results help complete part of the picture of the effects of the BTA (and WTO membership).
They are likely to serve as useful components in dynamic computable general equilibrium models of Vietnamese trade, which could usefully be applied more widely to trade issues in Vietnam.
